A Non-Romantic View of Expert Testimony by LaRue, Lewis H. & Caudill, David S.
  
1 
A Non-Romantic View of Expert Testimony 
Lewis H. LaRue∗ and David S. Caudill∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The public mind [in 1850s New Orleans] is bewildered by the 
contradictory opinions given by the Engineers in the state as to 
what ought and ought not to be done.  One says cut-offs is the 
only means of protecting the country.  Another says cut-offs will 
ruin the country, [so] make levees only. . . .  A third says make 
outlets.  Each one quotes opinions of foreign engineers and 
partial facts and pretended facts respecting the Mississippi [River] 
to support his views.  No wonder the legislature does nothing.1 
Last year, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 Seton Hall University School of Law 
held a symposium entitled, “Expert Admissibility: Keeping Gates, 
Goals and Promises” [hereinafter “Seton Hall Symposium”].  
Thereafter, the Seton Hall Law Review published the symposium’s 
proceedings in two issues, wherein numerous leading evidence 
scholars, as well as practitioners and a judge, offered assessments of 
current courtroom expertise jurisprudence.3  Given the flurry of 
scholarship that arose immediately following Daubert and the other 
two important opinions that, along with Daubert, comprise the Daubert 
trilogy (General Electric Co. v. Joiner4 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael5) 
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 1 JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND HOW IT 
CHANGED AMERICA 42 (1997) (quoting comments of Andrew Atkinson Humphreys) 
(ellipsis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 3 Expert Admissibility Symposium: Reliability Standards—Too High, Too Low, or Just 
Right?, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881 (2003); Expert Admissibility Symposium: What Is 
the Question?  What Is the Answer?  How Should the Court Frame a Question to Which 
Standards of Reliability Are to Be Applied?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2003) (proceedings 
of February 21-22, 2003, Symposium). 
 4 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 5 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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(the “trilogy”), one might have expected the Seton Hall Symposium 
to be a celebration of clarity and progress.  This expectation, 
however, went unmet.  Instead, Daubert has spawned a series of 
intense debates and controversies concerning each of the trilogy 
opinions—debates over the types of evidence that are, should be, or 
should not be, admissible in court; the role of judges and juries 
regarding expertise; and proposed reforms. 
For example, one symposium participant argued that “Daubert is 
the right [admissibility] standard because . . .  [t]he central issue is 
scientific ‘validity,’ and the criteria suggested by Daubert are useful in 
resolving that issue.”6  That argument was met with the view that the 
court’s “fundamental error” in adopting “science” as a legal category 
immediately gave rise to uncertainty as to whether Daubert “had made 
it more or less difficult for expert testimony to gain admission, a 
harbinger of the confusion that now surrounds the whole subject of 
admissibility of expert testimony.”7  Likewise, the abuse-of-discretion 
standard for appellate review of admissibility decisions, confirmed in 
Joiner, was attacked both by critics who support a change to allow 
“reviewing courts to appraise claims of error in applying Daubert on a 
de novo basis”8 (as nine states have done),9 and by critics who argue 
that plenary review of a federal trial court’s evidentiary ruling to 
exclude experts is already required on appeals from summary 
judgments or directed verdicts.10  Kumho Tire, the third case in the 
trilogy, was on the one hand praised for “making clear the . . . 
gatekeeping obligation in regard to non-science” and the “proper 
approach . . . even in regard to . . . science.”11  On the other hand, 
 
 6 Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts 
Should Help Find the Right Answers, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 987, 989 (2003). 
 7 John H. Mansfield, An Embarrassing Episode in the History of the Law of Evidence, 
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 81 (2003). 
 8 See Mueller, supra note 6, at 1023 (recommending new approach). 
 9 See id. at 1019 (“[N]ine states and the District of Columbia instruct appellate 
courts to review rulings admitting or excluding evidence presented by science by 
applying a de novo standard.”). 
 10 See The Honorable John J. Gibbons, Tenth Anniversary of the Supreme Court’s 
Decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: The Respective Roles of Trial 
and Appellate Courts in Daubert-Kumho Rulings, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 134 
(2003) (“This is my own view.  It is not . . . the view of the United States Supreme 
Court.”); see also In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 277 (3d Cir. 
1983) (holding that in summary judgment case, in limine evidentiary rulings to 
exclude evidence “involved fundamental legal error” requiring plenary review), rev’d 
on other grounds, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
(1983). 
 11 Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: 
How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 31 
(2003). 
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Kumho Tire was also characterized as a “mismatch between tool and 
task” (instructing “lower courts to apply standards that simply do not 
apply”)12 and as an “embarrassing episode” in the history of evidence 
law,13 because it is too restrictive (i.e., “relevance is not enough” 
under Kumho Tire).14  Moreover, because Kumho Tire’s case-specific 
evaluation “conflicts with widely-accepted methods of gauging 
validity, and guarantees that we cannot develop consistent or useful 
precedent,”15 some have viewed it as a departure from “bedrock 
scientific principles.”  More specifically, the reliability standards 
developed in the Daubert trilogy were, under various formulations, too 
high in civil cases,16 too low for prosecutors17 and many forensic 
scientists,18 and too high for criminal defendants.19  Furthermore, at 
least in practice, the reliability standards were too low for police 
“experts” and too high for social scientists.20  Finally, some justified 
Daubert gatekeeping on the basis that jurors struggle with complex 
cases and statistical evidence,21 or that a decision “to admit expert 
testimony will seem to the jury to be some kind of endorsement.”22  
Still others pointed out that “statements that jurors render inaccurate 
verdicts are not supported by much empirical evidence,”23 and that 
there “is simply ‘no evidence that juries are incompetent to evaluate 
expert testimony.’”24  In this robust discourse, although we read the 
 
 12 Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Supreme Court: What is the Problem?, 34 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1, 2 (2003). 
 13 Mansfield, supra note 7, at 84. 
 14 Id. at 85. 
 15 Joëlle Anne Moreno, Eyes Wide Shut: Hidden Problems and Future Consequences of 
the Fact-Based Validity Standard, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 89, 96 (2003). 
 16 See Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role in Civil Litigation and the Abdication of 
Legal Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 943, 960 (stating that 
“law should allow in conclusions that science filters out”). 
 17 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1071, 1074 (asserting that exacting standards required in civil litigation 
are not being applied to criminal cases). 
 18 See generally Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science 
(Especially Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167 (2003). 
 19 See generally Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 
SETON HALL L. REV. 105 (2003). 
 20 See Jennifer L. Groscup & Steven D. Penrod, Battle of the Standards for Experts in 
Criminal Cases: Police vs. Psychologists, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1141, 1147 (2003) (“Our 
suspicion is that . . . police officers are viewed as inherently reliable by courts.”), id. at 
1148 (“[C]ourts and commentators have been highly critical of psychologists 
testifying as experts.”). 
 21 See Joseph Sanders, The Merits of Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 901 (2003). 
 22 Saks, supra note 18, at 1170. 
 23 Mansfield, supra note 7, at 86. 
 24 Michel F. Baumeister & Dorothea M. Capone, Admissibility Standards as 
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trilogy differently than some do, we find much with which to agree.  
Conversely, we also find some critiques of the trilogy less than 
compelling. 
Elsewhere, we have offered a defense, of sorts, of the Daubert 
trilogy, or at least an interpretation of how the standards (for 
evaluating expertise) that emerge from the trilogy can and do work 
for judges and lawyers.25  Briefly, there are clues in Justice Blackmun’s 
Daubert opinion that the so-called four-factor test for scientific 
validity, because it does not constitute “a definitive checklist or test,”26 
should not be overemphasized.27  Instead, the four factors are merely 
general observations, and “many [other] factors” will bear on the 
determination that valid science was properly applied.28  Moreover, 
the requirement that trial judges must decide, as a preliminary 
matter, whether the “methodology properly can be applied to the 
facts in issue”29 tempered the recommended focus on “methodology, 
not . . . conclusions.”30  Joiner resolved that apparent inconsistency.  
There, the trial judge’s emphasis on proper application (to the case 
at hand) was approved on the basis that “conclusions and 
methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.”31  That is, 
even when an expert’s methodology is scientific, an “analytical gap 
between the data and the opinion proffered”32 may persist.  For 
scientists and non-scientists alike, the emphasis on application was 
confirmed in Kumho Tire, as was the flexibility of the four factor “test” 
in Daubert, which “neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all 
experts in every case. . . .  [S]cientific foundations . . . will be at issue 
in some cases.  [But] in other cases, the relevant reliability concerns 
may focus upon personal knowledge or experience. . . .  Too much 
depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at 
 
Politics—The Imperial Gate Closers Arrive!!!, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1025, 1041 (2003) 
(quoting Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Jury in the Twenty-First Century: 
An Interdisciplinary Conference Article: Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 
1175 (2001)). 
 25 See generally David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert 
Trilogy Need to Know About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—and not Just the 
Methodological—Aspects of Science, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2003) (approving of federal 
appellate courts’ generally pragmatic approach toward science). 
 26 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (outlining four factors: testability, peer-reviewed 
publication, low error rate, and general acceptance). 
 27 Id. at 593. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 595. 
 31 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 155. 
 32 See id. at 146. 
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issue.”33  One could thus read Kumho Tire narrowly as holding that it is 
relevant for engineers and not “real scientists.”  But much like 
engineering, whenever science comes into the courtroom, it is as 
applied science, not pure theory.  For example, in determining 
whether the blood at the crime scene is the defendant’s, the court 
moves from pure theory to a laboratory technician to the expert, who 
combines theory, lab results, personal observations, and informed 
judgments that can aid the trier of fact. 
Accordingly, as a whole, the Daubert trilogy deflects attention 
away from abstract identifications of scientific validity, including the 
“demarcation” controversy concerning the elimination of alleged 
“junk science” from the courtroom.  Instead, attention is directed 
toward the application of expertise to the particular “case at hand.”  
This emphasis on application is reflected as well in the Seton Hall 
Symposium proceedings, which offer three patterns or contours that 
provide useful guidance to judges and lawyers.  First, there is a 
pragmatic recognition, in various forms, that the focus should be on 
how science is being used rather than on science in the abstract.  
Second, that focus must be accompanied by a modest view of science 
rather than an idealized version of its capacity to produce knowledge 
for law.  Third, the focus on the application phase of expertise must 
also be accompanied by a modest view of law itself, including judges, 
lawyers, juries, and the evidentiary rules.  In the post-trilogy series of 
debates, it is far too easy to romanticize the power of science, or the 
virtues of the legal system, or both, and to fail to recognize their 
practical limitations.  Just as romantic images of law often rely on 
demonizations of judges untrained in science, overzealous lawyers, or 
emotional, uncritical and confused jurors, romantic images of science 
are often bolstered by demonizations of forensic scientists, plaintiffs’ 
experts, or social scientists.  Thus, the pragmatic emphasis on 
application must be mediated by pragmatic views of both science and 
law.  Fortunately, the pragmatic aspects of science and law—which we 
associate with their local, social, rhetorical, and institutional 
features—are most visible in the focus on application.  Nevertheless, 
the limitations of law and science often recede into the background; 
as a result, undue attention is given to red herrings and unrealistic 
reform proposals. 
 
 
 33 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141, 150. 
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II. THE ACTION IS IN THE APPLICATION 
[T]he answer to what question is to be asked of the expert post-
Kumho is precisely whatever questions should have been asked 
post- (and for that matter pre-) Daubert, to-wit: Does the expert in 
fact possess knowledge useful to this trial that is being brought to 
bear upon it in a way that increases the probability of accurate 
outcomes?34 
The proper emphasis on application in determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony is epitomized in the phrase “brought 
to bear.”  One must focus on the way science is used in the 
courtroom, not on science or law in the abstract.  Otherwise, there is 
a risk, in post-trilogy legal discourse, that one’s scholarly analysis or 
reform proposal will “smell of the lamp” and be of no use in the 
rather rough area that is a trial—that which looks elegant and 
symmetrical in the study can look deformed in the courtroom. 
In contemporary post-trilogy discourse, the focus on application 
takes numerous forms.  For example, Professors Gross and Mnookin, 
after noting that “thousands of pages have been written about both 
the proper [threshold] criteria for evaluating the reliability of expert 
evidence and the institutional competence of judges to evaluate 
scientific reliability,” recommend that we examine “another 
dimension: the degree of certainty that the expert posits in what she 
offers.”35 
One of the central problems with much expert testimony 
introduced in court—both scientific and non-scientific alike—is 
that experts claim as matters of fact or probability opinions that 
should be couched in more cautious terms, as possibilities or 
hypotheses. 
 . . . . 
 . . . Often, whether testimony is based on scientific study or 
more casual forms of observation, what makes an expert’s 
conclusion unreliable is that it is expressed with a confidence not 
warranted by the evidence.36 
That emphasis on levels of confidence is echoed in Professor Berger’s 
sense that “Daubert overemphasizes how the data underlying the 
expert’s opinion was produced and distracts courts and counsel from 
carefully analyzing what the evidence proves, and how it is being 
 
 34 Allen, supra note 12, at 7. 
 35 Samuel R. Gross & Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Information and Expert Evidence: 
A Preliminary Taxonomy, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 141, 143 (2003). 
 36 Id. at 143-44. 
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used.  Daubert stresses the medium over the message.”37 
While we agree that careful analysis of what the evidence proves 
(and how it is used) is fundamental, we disagree that Daubert, 
especially as interpreted in the remainder of the trilogy, detracts from 
that task.  Assuming that Daubert’s four factors are not “a definitive 
checklist,” and that judges must decide whether “methodology 
properly can be applied to the facts in issue,”38 the methodological 
medium is neither overemphasized nor disconnected from the 
expert’s message.  To illustrate, the “peer review and publication” 
factor is not determinative of admissibility because, as Professor 
Moreno points out, that factor in the abstract “tells us nothing 
about . . . whether the validity of the published methods or 
conclusions is [relevant to] the manner in which this expert proposes 
to use the theory or technique to make inferences or draw 
conclusions in this case.”39  Moreover, even some scholars who 
disagree over whether Daubert as applied is too restrictive or not 
restrictive enough agree on the need to focus on the application 
phase.  For example, Professor Saks, who is concerned that the value 
of much forensic science continues to be exaggerated, summarizes 
the elemental conditions of admissibility of expert evidence as 
follows: “(a) the opinions and conclusions of the expert are 
accompanied by information that enables the factfinder to evaluate 
the likely accuracy of the expert’s opinion, and (b) the information is 
presented in such a way that factfinders will not . . . excessively 
[overvalue] the testimony.”40  Likewise, Professor Friedman—who, in 
contrast with Professor Saks, criticizes the Daubert regime as overly 
exclusionary—nevertheless recommends that “in some settings . . . 
courts should admit expert evidence but explain to the jury factors 
limiting the weight that the jury should accord the evidence. . . .  
Sometimes the . . . court[s] should . . . comment adversely on it.”41  
Therefore, reliability in the abstract may not be as important as 
whether “the expert witness over-claimed the significance of the . . . 
result” of forensic scientific inquiry.42  All of these variable expositions 
 
 37 Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions Daubert 
Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2003). 
 38 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 39 Moreno, supra note 15, at 99. 
 40 Saks, supra note 18, at 1167. 
 41 Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1047, 1048 (2003). 
 42 Id. at 1063; see also Roger C. Park, Daubert on a Tilted Playing Field, 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1113, 1114 (2003) (“I share Professor Friedman’s hope that better 
testimony about the limits of forensic science testimony, accompanied by thoughtful 
instructions, will lead to better results.”). 
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on confidence levels—the manner in which evidence is used, and 
whether experts over-claim or juries overvalue—emphasize the 
application phase of expertise.43 
Assuming that one focuses on how science is “brought to bear” 
in the courtroom, and that one takes a modest and non-romantic 
view of both law and science, what are the principal problems and 
greatest dangers that we face?  Where could improvements be made 
that will lead to more accurate decisions?  With these questions in 
mind, several suggestions made during the Seton Hall Symposium 
appear promising.  For example, Professor Nance observed that 
current “practice is often overly generous to proponents in allowing 
opinion on case-specific material facts, ultimate or not, when those 
facts are not within the personal knowledge of the expert.”44  In a 
similar vein, Professor Berger recommended that because 
“[a]dmissibility and sufficiency determinations rest on more than 
 
 43 An emphasis on application, rather than on abstract definitions of scientific 
reliability, does not necessitate the creation of a “legal science” that does not 
correspond to science itself.  Professor Nance, for example, appropriately demystifies 
the concepts of reliability, testing, and error rates by showing that they are each 
matters of degree.  Instead of stabilizing an admissibility decision, each simply 
generates a question about how much reliability, how much testing (and of what 
quality), and how low an error rate is required in the courtroom.  See Dale A. Nance, 
Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 199-201 (2003).  
Nance’s next step, however, is to question why “the final determination . . . be 
determined by the norms of the scientific community instead of those of the legal 
community . . . ?”  Id. at 203.  Like Joe Cecil, he avoids the “ephemeral” search for 
scientific validity by recommending that courts establish “a legal threshold for 
sufficiency that [is] independent of any uniform scientific standard.”  Joe S. Cecil, 
Construing Science in the Quest for “Ipse Dixit”: A Comment on Sanders and Cohen, 33 
SETON HALL L. REV. 967, 985, 986 (2003).  That task is neither necessitated by the 
focus on application nor particularly helpful to the legal process.  While “the 
reliability criterion should be relative,” and courts certainly must make policy 
decisions as to what level of reliability, testing, or error rates are required in court, 
“the evidentiary determination regarding expert evidence must take into account—it 
must integrate into its foundational premises—the culture of the scientific 
method. . . .  This needs to be understood as a matter of science policy.”  David L. 
Faigman, Expert Evidence in Flatland: The Geometry of a World Without Scientific Culture, 
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 255, 258-59 (2003).  In light of our argument that the focus 
on application only works when it is accompanied by a modest view of science (and 
of law) as a local, pragmatic enterprise, this is an especially significant point.  We are 
in complete agreement with Professor Nance’s observation that “scientific validity is 
not an all-or-nothing characteristic.”  Nance, supra, at 200.  We also completely agree 
with Joe Cecil’s identification of “the diverse views and values that characterize the 
scientific academy.”  Cecil, supra, at 985.  Therefore, we see no reason to disregard 
the pragmatic culture of science in favor of another, and undoubtedly lesser, “legal” 
science.  Indeed, the basis for such disregard is either an idealization of science as 
too good for law (i.e., its standards are too high), or an idealization of law as 
somehow better than science. 
 44 Nance, supra note 43, at 242-43. 
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satisfaction of a reliability component[,] they require careful 
attention to what the evidence proves and how the trier of fact will 
use it.”45  With respect to fingerprint identification expertise, 
Professor Saks confirmed that: 
a court must determine what the fingerprint comparison problem 
is (a clear and complete latent print versus a tiny fragment versus 
a montage of numerous overlaid smeared latents, etc.) and 
whether the data show that the expert is likely to be able to 
perform that particular type of examination accurately.  Under 
[Kumho Tire], a court is not to ask about a field in a general and 
global way.46 
Hence, the recommendation by Freidman and others, mentioned 
above,47 that “[j]udicial comment, expressing reasons to limit the 
significance of the evidence, [is sometimes] appropriate.”48 
To be sure, the task of improving the way in which science is 
“brought to bear” is not trivial.  Rather, it is worth our best efforts to 
generate creative suggestions to aid the bench and bar with the 
application phase of expertise in the courtroom.  Many scholars, in 
criticizing existing practices and in their proposals for reform, 
acknowledge the significance of the application phase.  Nevertheless, 
many still fail to possess modest expectations of both science and law.  
Too many academics idealize either law or science—respectively 
demonizing, on the one hand, courtroom experts, and on the other 
hand, judges, lawyers, and juries.  Given that law and science are local 
and cultural enterprises with practical goals and limitations, a non-
romantic, pragmatic approach to both is appropriate. 
Idealizing law and/or science prevents one from focusing on the 
most important problem associated with the use of science (and 
other evidence) at trials.  Our own view of the matter accords with 
that expressed in Schafersman v. Agland Cooperative,49 where the 
Nebraska Supreme Court was 
convinced that by shifting the focus to the kind of reasoning 
required in science—empirically supported rational 
explanation—the Daubert/Joiner/Kumho Tire Co. trilogy of cases 
greatly improves the reliability of the information upon which 
verdicts and other legal decisions are based.  Because courts and 
juries cannot do justice in a factual vacuum, the better 
information the fact finders have, the more likely that verdicts will 
 
 45 Berger, supra note 37, at 1140. 
 46 Saks, supra note 18, at 1176. 
 47 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
 48 Friedman, supra note 41, at 1064. 
 49 631 N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 2001). 
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be just.50 
What we like most about this statement, brought to our attention by 
Professor Sanders,51 is its definition of the scientific method as 
“empirically supported rational explanation.”  Notably, this form of 
reasoning should also be at the core of law, journalism, history, 
sociology, and any other form of thought that, however distant the 
support and uncertain the conclusions, purports to rest conclusions 
on facts.  This sort of modest, realistic assessment of what science 
(and law) should hope to achieve is the only plausible way to identify 
the true problems that arise from the use of scientific evidence in 
court.  Conversely, idealistic pictures of law and science stand in the 
way of understanding the real problems. 
Furthermore, abstract theorizing about “what is science?” does 
not seem profitable.  After all, a group of law professors, lawyers, and 
judges has a rather remote chance of successfully identifying a set of 
useful and cogent criteria that would demark science from non-
science.52  As noted above, we do not think that Justice Blackmun 
intended to construct a definition of science; furthermore, the 
crucial precedents do not seem to turn on that inquiry.  For example, 
in Daubert on remand, Joiner, and Kumho Tire, the judges never stated 
that the excluded testimony was the product of “junk science.”  In 
each of these cases, the judges accepted that the field of expertise 
that formed the basis of the excluded testimony was wholly 
legitimate.53  On the other hand, in each of these cases, the judges 
determined that the application of the expertise, that is, the way in 
which the expertise was “brought to bear,” was dubious. 
In the next section, we begin by identifying some idealizations of 
 
 50 Id. at 876. 
 51 See Sanders, supra note 21, at 938 n.246. 
 52 See Mansfield, supra note 7, at 81 (“The truth is that . . . there is no clear 
understanding and agreement about what is meant by ‘science,’ ‘good science,’ or 
‘the scientific method.’”). 
 53 In Daubert on remand, plaintiff’s experts were all deemed to be “experts in 
their respective fields”; the “animal studies, chemical structure analyses and 
epidemiological data” on which they relied were not in question.  One expert, 
however, failed to show how his conclusion that Bendectin causes limb defects was 
reached.  The others could not show causation, but merely a possibility, in this case.  
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317-22 (9th Cir. 1995).  
Likewise, in Joiner, the animal studies and the four epidemiological studies which the 
plaintiff’s experts relied on were not in question, though a gap existed between that 
data and the expert opinion on causation.  See 522 U.S. at 144-46.  Finally, in Kumho 
Tire, the issue “was not the reasonableness in general of a tire expert’s use of a visual 
and tactile inspection . . . .  Rather, it was the reasonableness of using that 
approach . . . to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert 
testimony was directly relevant.”  526 U.S. at 153-54. 
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science in recent post-trilogy scholarship.  In our analysis of each, we 
explore the manner in which romantic images of science deflect 
attention away from the application phase, resulting in proposals for 
reform that are unworkable.  Along the way, we also set forth the 
contours of a modest view of science. 
III. MODEST VERSUS IDEALIZED VIEWS OF SCIENCE 
The closer the empirical focus on the actual workings of science, 
and the more current and uncertain the area of science 
examined, the more difficult it is to identify simple ideal models 
of methods and norms.54 
Certain idealizations of science are easier to detect than others.  
To be sure, it is difficult, in light of scientific progress, to locate 
persons who view science as merely a social or cultural phenomenon, 
not unlike religion or mythology.  Similarly, it is not easy to find 
persons who view the scientific enterprise as simply an accumulated 
body of objective, universal, timeless truth.  Nevertheless, between 
those extremes, judges and commentators may expect too much from 
science in the courtroom.  The basis of such expectations is often a 
subtle idealization of the scientific enterprise.  Although science is 
best characterized both by (i) its methodological rigor and 
technically efficacious outcomes, and (ii) its social, institutional, and 
rhetorical features, an undue focus on the former characteristics can 
deflect attention away from the latter. 
Baumeister and Capone’s account of post-trilogy expertise, for 
example, begins with a modest view of science in law—probabilistic, 
sometimes shaky, and often uncertain.55  Their essential argument, 
that toxic tort plaintiffs are unfairly disadvantaged by post-trilogy 
reliability requirements, concludes by drawing an analogy between 
plaintiffs’ experts and Copernicus, whose novel “theories and 
research [might not] find their way past the admissibility gates of an 
increasingly imperial judiciary applying a Daubert analysis.”56 
 Early in the sixteenth century, great thinkers of the Western 
World unanimously believed that the earth lay at the center of the 
universe . . . .  So deeply held was this belief, that it was 
considered heresy to think otherwise.  But one man dared to 
 
 54 Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing “Junk Science,” 1998 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 3, & 44. 
 55 See Baumeister & Capone, supra note 24, at 1032 (stating that epidemiological 
and toxicological studies are probabilistic), 1033 (“[E]pidemiological and 
toxicological studies are inherently incapable of establishing causation to a 
certainty.”). 
 56 Id. at 1046. 
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believe otherwise.  Nicolaus Copernicus, sitting alone in a turret 
and using just his eyes . . . sketched and re-sketched his celestial 
observations.57 
This romantic picture, offered with a citation to, inter alia, an 
Irish Times article,58 unwittingly represents science as the product of 
an individual, standing alone against a community of seemingly great 
thinkers; the role of social institutions is either negative or non-
existent.  In this story, the social aspects of science belong to the 
mainstream scientific community, where strong commitments, leaps 
of faith, omission of counterarguments, political strategies, and 
religious devotion hinder scientific discovery and progress.  
Unfortunately, Copernicus was not alone, did not use only his eyes, 
had strong commitments, engaged in leaps of faith, omitted 
counterarguments, and was both politically astute and religious.59  
The analogy breaks down because the social, institutional, and 
rhetorical aspects of science are not simply impediments to 
overcome; inevitably, they are aspects of good science.  That is, they 
make the best science possible.  Naturally, in certain cases, social 
factors—such as fraud due to ambition, laboratory carelessness, and 
refusal to acknowledge data that contradict a favored theory—serve 
as barriers to scientific progress.  Nevertheless, the “social” is a 
feature of both science’s failures and successes.  Significantly, 
scientific progress relies on social interaction, institutional support, 
and rhetorical strategies, including consensus-building techniques, 
persuasion, and governing metaphors and models. 
Recognition of science’s social, institutional, and rhetorical 
aspects, not as a critique of scientific methodology but rather as an 
appreciation of the pragmatic limitations of scientific expertise, 
would lead commentators to a modest view of the scientific 
enterprise.  Conversely, the failure to recognize the inevitable social 
 
 57 Id. at 1045. 
 58 See id. n.134 (citing Brendan McWilliams, Copernicus and the Centre of the 
Universe, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 19, 2003, available at 2003 WL 12226971), id. n.136, id. at 
1046 n.141. 
 59 See Edmond & Mercer, supra note 54, & 63 (“[T]he history of science reveals 
that it is common for scientists to have strong commitments to their views during the 
early phases of new research.  Evaluated in the context of their own time and 
[place], the theories of . . . Copernicus relied upon leaps of faith and observations at 
the threshold of theoretical plausibility, together with the deliberate omission of 
counter arguments.”); see also STEPHEN F. MASON, A HISTORY OF THE SCIENCES 127-34 
(1962) (discussing Copernicus’ reliance on conventional methodology; religious, 
purposive, and teleological arguments; medieval as well as modern explanations; and 
promotion of new values).  With respect to Copernicus’ rhetorical strategies and his 
interaction with other scientists, see generally JEAN DIETZ MOSS, NOVELTIES IN THE 
HEAVENS: RHETORIC AND SCIENCE IN THE COPERNICAN CONTROVERSY (1993). 
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context of scientific inquiry leads to the subtle idealizations of science 
that persist in post-trilogy scholarship.  Such romanticizations of 
science come in several forms, including reliance on a “deficit model” 
of scientific knowledge for law, an overemphasis on methodology as 
the marker of good science, and a belief that rooting out “junk 
science” is the primary goal of post-trilogy admissibility standards. 
Scholars who rely on a deficit model of science tend to view the 
courtroom as an institutional space for social conflicts, wherein 
interested lawyers hire interested experts and attempt to persuade 
judges and juries who are deficient; that is, they lack scientific 
knowledge.60  Science, on the other hand, is viewed as a source of 
stable, interest-free knowledge.  From that perspective, science is not 
social like law; at its core, science is neither institutional nor 
rhetorical, but is an adjudicator of social conflicts.  Critics of the 
deficit model, on the other hand, point out that science is like law—
science is just another community, with its own institutions, language, 
rhetorical techniques, internal controversies, gatekeeping 
procedures, and credentialing processes.  While few would disagree 
with that assessment, some scholars in their post-trilogy discourse 
write as though science is better than that.  Professor Moreno, for 
example, who challenges the “task at hand” approach in Kumho Tire, 
bases her critique on a perceived lack of judicial understanding of 
basic scientific concepts.61  We have elsewhere challenged the 
Gatowski study upon which Moreno relies,62 precisely because that 
survey romanticizes scientific methodology, and Moreno’s critique of 
the case-specific evaluation of science “as applied” becomes a case in 
point.  Instead of recognizing that science itself is a local enterprise 
with practical goals and limitations even before it enters the 
courtroom, Moreno seemingly idealizes science as a linear story of 
progress: 
A legal decision that is grounded in fact-specific validity (e.g., a 
conclusion based on the specific scientific data relied upon by this 
expert to reliably explain these facts) is the antithesis of science.  
Science, in all of its disciplines, is cumulative and based on a 
continuing aggregation of new data.63 
Such an exaggerated view of science is surprising for two 
 
 60 For a brief discussion of the deficit model, see Caudill & LaRue, supra note 25, 
at 7-8. 
 61 See Moreno, supra note 15, at 96-98 (citing Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking the 
Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert 
World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001)). 
 62 See Caudill & LaRue, supra note 25, at 8-20. 
 63 Moreno, supra note 15, at 102 (emphasis added). 
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reasons.  To begin with, the first sentence of the above quotation 
seems to actually describe scientific or laboratory inquiry at the pre-
publication phase—this scientist reaches this conclusion on the basis 
of this data to explain these facts.  The second sentence quoted above 
conflicts with the history of scientific progress: New data is not always 
cumulative, but often revolutionary.64  To be fair, Moreno makes the 
point that an expert potentially can “prove” something to a jury that 
no other scientist would consider valid.  In that case, however, there 
actually has been no reliable application to a set of facts.  Therefore, 
when Moreno says that “whether a particular scientific theory or 
methodology has been reliably applied to a given set of facts [is] 
scientifically meaningless,”65 this only makes sense if a “reliable 
application” of methodology to given facts is potentially unreliable by 
reference to something else.  That something else, according to 
Moreno, is global reliability, as opposed to local reliability.  To support 
that view, Moreno quotes Professor Allen, who observed that a “local” 
argument in court must rest on a global epistemological warrant.  In 
other words, a condition of “local” testimony is global expertise, and 
“without global reliability, one has gibberish.”66  Unlike Moreno, 
however, Allen does not explicitly say that an application could be 
locally reliable and globally unreliable.  Allen says that “accurate 
outcomes locally” must rest on a global warrant, and that global 
validity is a condition for appropriate local testimony.67  Using the 
term “reliable” to refer to an unreliable (because local) application, as 
Moreno does, is a misreading of Kumho Tire’s focus on application.  
Such a misinterpretation can only be explained by a romantic view of 
science as a global source of cumulative knowledge against which 
 
 64 See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
(1962). 
 65 Id. (emphasis added). 
 66 Id. n.54 (quoting Allen, supra note 12, at 6). 
 67 See id.  We even have our doubts about Professor Allen’s formulation of the 
importance of global reliability.  Professor Berger, for example, points out that while 
microscopic hair analysis can be considered “unreliable because it has not been 
tested adequately to satisfy Daubert[,] trained examiners do have some proficiency in 
comparing samples accurately . . . .”  Berger, supra note 37, at 1134.  Even Allen 
qualifies his argument: 
When I say that it is necessary to establish the “global” issue of 
reliability, I am merely saying that virtually all trial testimony will be 
embedded in or a part of some larger body of knowledge, and that the 
reliability of the testimony will depend in part on the reliability of the 
inferentially prior propositions or methodologies involved. 
Allen, supra note 12, at 10; see also id. n.24 (“I suspect that this is true of all testimony, 
actually.”).  Moreover, Allen adds, “[t]he precise contours of the necessary [global] 
background will depend on the precise testimony directly relevant to the case that is 
being proffered.”  Id. at 10. 
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local scientists check their conclusions.  That, we think, is the 
antithesis of science.  Science is properly characterized by its 
conjectures and refutations, and by its willingness to challenge, in 
local settings, the current body of received scientific knowledge. 
Reliance on the deficit model leading to idealization of science 
is also evident in Professor Sanders’ otherwise insightful article on 
“paternalism” toward the jury in cases involving expert testimony.68 
Arguably, compared to Moreno’s, Sanders’ idealization is much more 
subtle and harmless.  Given that Sanders seems to view the 
gatekeeping effort, which keeps confusing and potentially misleading 
expert testimony away from the jury, as a means to “protect” the jury, 
his use of the term “paternalism” is problematic.  In actuality, the 
party against whom evidence is offered is the party requiring 
protection.69  Given that “shap[ing] another’s preferences in ways 
that bypass the other’s capacity to resist”70 does not sound protective, 
“paternalism” may simply be poor word choice.  In any event, Sanders 
is concerned with jurors’ ability to understand science.  Even as he 
provides a superb summary of the conflicting research on jury 
confusion, Sanders distinguishes between “central or systematic 
processing [wherein] people examine the content of a 
communication to assess its validity,” and 
peripheral or heuristic processing, [wherein] people do not 
attend to the quality and validity of arguments.  Rather, they 
adopt shortcuts to determine the value of a message.  People rely 
on factors such as the number of arguments (rather than their 
quality), the attractiveness of the communicator, and the 
communicator’s credentials.71 
Throughout the remainder of his article, Sanders focuses on 
juries’ ability to process scientific knowledge.  Sanders’ analysis, 
however, presumes that we are trying to deliver scientific knowledge, 
of the right quality and validity, into this deficient setting known as 
the jury.  That approach seems to lack any critical reflection on the 
nature of scientific knowledge and discourse.  Even among scientists, 
 
 68 See generally Sanders, supra note 21. 
 69 Sanders explains that “paternalism exists even when the class of persons whose 
good is involved is not the same as the class of persons whose freedom is restricted.”  
Id. at 897.  “Requiring medical doctors to be licensed . . . [is] paternalistic in this 
sense.  [Such regulation is] intended to protect consumers.  Admissibility restrictions 
that are justified because they are best for the parties to the litigation, or for the legal 
system itself, are paternalistic in the same way.”  Id. at 897-98.  Perhaps, then, the 
exclusionary rules in Sanders’ analysis are not protecting the jury. 
 70 Id. at 897 (citing DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE 
MORAL BOUNDS ON BENEVOLENCE 19 (1986)). 
 71 Id. at 909. 
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both types of processing exist—scientists adopt shortcuts, such as 
reliance on a fellow scientist’s credentials or fidelity to a paradigm, 
which the deficit model tends to ignore.  Again, rather than viewing 
science as “content” to be delivered into a deficient receptacle, we 
prefer to see two communities—one scientific, the other “public”—
both characterized by surplus and deficit. 
In the end, Sanders finds the evidence inconclusive, despite 
numerous studies, as to whether reliability requirements are justified 
to “shelter jurors from their own shortcomings.”72  Though we 
contend that reliability requirements shelter the litigants from juror 
shortcomings, we understand Sanders’ point: If jurors struggle with 
complex scientific arguments such that their decisions are incorrect, 
judges ought to intervene as gatekeepers.  Of course, Sanders 
concedes, not only is there “no research that addresses” the 
correctness of decisions “under various admissibility regimes,”73 but 
“we probably do not have much agreement about what constitutes a 
‘correct’ outcome.”74  Here, Sanders has stumbled upon the deficit 
model’s problem. 
To illustrate, if a hypothetical observer (who is not a scientist) 
had to decide whether complex expertise generally confuses and 
misleads jurors, there is no secure scientific knowledge of which the 
observer is deficient.  Moreover, there is no “central or systematic” 
process that can attend to the validity of the arguments pro and con.  
Instead, there is a scientific controversy among social scientists, who, 
in their respective conclusions, attend not only to methodological 
standards, but also to persuasiveness, credentials, and consensus.  
Simply stated, this is the manner in which science works.  Scientific 
practices are 
components of craft, or tacit knowledge, over which there is a 
negotiated consensus for given times and places during settled 
periods of science. . . .  Judgments as to what constitutes 
“good” . . . science . . . are social judgments open to dispute and 
negotiation, and are affected by considerations such as the status 
of relevant scientists [and] their research backgrounds.75 
Once a controversy in science is settled, the result can be 
explained, in a sort of post hoc revisionism, as a methodological 
victory, and the social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects of science 
will recede into the background.  In the controversial literature 
 
 72 Id. at 891. 
 73 Id. at 899. 
 74 Sanders, supra note 21, at 931. 
 75 Edmond & Mercer, supra note 54, & 30. 
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(concerning juries and expertise) discussed by Sanders, however, the 
social is quite visible.  Due to Sanders’ persistent focus on juror 
deficits, however, the social is also ignored. 
Even among scholars who do not fall prey to the deficit model, 
characterizing science singularly as methodological often eclipses 
science’s social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects.  Professor Neil 
Cohen, for example, in his commentary on evidentiary gatekeeping 
by judges, uses the popular metaphor of the “black box” to describe 
the process by which data is given to an expert, who draws 
conclusions by an “analysis [that] takes place out of sight of the 
factfinders.”76 
An example of that model might be . . . a . . . handwriting expert, 
who is given samples[,] . . .  analyzes them, and pronounces the 
document [in question] to have been written (or not . . . ) by the 
defendant.  While the expert might recite the factors that lead . . . 
to the conclusion, the process by which those factors are weighed 
and balanced, as well as the justification for using those factors 
and not others, takes place in the expert’s mind.77 
By contrast, for Cohen, “the testimony of epidemiologists and 
scientists using similar methods . . . is based on expertise that takes 
place in a ‘clear box’ in which the entire thought process of the 
expert can be monitored and assessed.”78  Significantly, however, the 
metaphor of the black box can be used in many different ways.  
Among sociologists (of science), the conventional use of the term 
“black box” is to describe the manner in which scientific discourse 
hides its social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects.79  From a 
scientistic perspective, one should focus on hypothesis, data, 
methodology, and result.  Consequently, the “surrounding” or 
“contextual” factors such as personality, markers of credibility, 
funding, consensus-building processes, and values are “black-boxed” 
as insignificant.  In Cohen’s account of the black box, however, once 
we focus in court on the thought process of the expert—theory, data, 
methodology—we now have a “clear box.”  From the perspective of a 
sociologist or historian of science, this is a “black-boxing” maneuver.  
In other words, science itself has been idealized as an almost 
mechanical producer of knowledge,  while the expert, along with the 
 
 76 Cohen, supra note 16, at 960. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 961. 
 79 See David S. Caudill, Barely Opening, Then Slamming Shut, Science’s “Black Box” in 
Law: A Response to Beecher-Monas’s Heuristics, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1795, 1796 (2002) 
(citing Langdon Winner, Social Constructivism: Opening the Black Box and Finding It 
Empty, 16 SCI. AS CULTURE 427, 431 (1993)). 
 18 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:001 
expert’s social authority, institutional status, and rhetorical strategies, 
has disappeared.  Following his idealization of science, Cohen argues 
that since scientific standards are too high for law, expert opinions 
that would not qualify as “real” science should be allowed into court.80 
Joe Cecil, in his response to Cohen’s analysis, adopts an 
appropriately modest view of science.  Cecil acknowledges the 
ephemerality of “scientific validity” and “the diverse views and values 
that characterize the scientific academy—one science’s accepted 
methodology may be another science’s ipse dixit.”81  In his analysis of 
Soldo v. Sandoz Pharmaceutical Corp.,82 Cecil highlights the 
disagreements among the three independent experts in the case, 
whose varying standards resulted in different assessments of 
causation.83 
Soldo reveals [that a] court must reconcile conflicting values of 
numerous sciences, each with differing intellectual processes, 
differing assumptions, and differing degrees of tolerance for 
extrapolation from scientific studies to human circumstances. . . .  
Even when free of distortions imposed by the legal forum [e.g., 
party sponsorship or adversarial presentation], distinguished 
scholars from different disciplines will invoke diverse standards 
and practices in assessing evidence.84 
The above statement both criticizes the notion that scientific 
methodology is a uniform or singular marker of reliability or validity, 
and confirms the scientific enterprise’s pragmatic and socially 
contingent character.  Cecil, however, focuses on the Soldo trial 
judge’s rejection of the notion that experts need only meet “the same 
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice” of others in 
the field.85  In the court’s words, while 
it is sometimes necessary in a clinical, regulatory, or business 
practice to make decisions based on less than sufficient and/or 
reliable scientific evidence due to practical demands requiring 
immediate decision-making, such guesses, although perhaps 
reasonable hypotheses based on the best available evidence, do 
not constitute a scientifically reliable approach when used to 
assess causality via the scientific method.86 
 
 80 See Cohen, supra note 16, at 949 (“Science . . . routinely uses filters that prevent 
its experts from reaching exactly the sort of opinions . . . that should be utilized in a 
civil trial.”). 
 81 See Cecil, supra note 43, at 985. 
 82 244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
 83 See Cecil, supra note 43, at 973-80. 
 84 Id. at 984. 
 85 See id. at 985. 
 86 Id. at 984. 
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That judicial perspective conflicts with the views of scholars like 
Cohen, who advocate lowering post-trilogy reliability requirements.87  
Nonetheless, that perspective is shared by those trial judges who tend 
to idealize science and who are reversed (by appellate panels who 
have a pragmatic view of science) for demanding more of science 
than it can reasonably offer.88  From the standpoint of those who 
idealize science, the post-trilogy reliability standards are too low.  But 
why would Cecil, having recognized that “validity” is ephemeral and 
methodologies diverse, agree with such a distinction between the 
lofty notions of reliability/method and the mere “guessing” that 
scientists engage in everywhere except in the courtroom?  One 
possible explanation is that when describing the variations between 
the independent experts in Soldo, Cecil focuses primarily on their 
methodological variations, not their extra-methodological intellectual 
processes, assumptions, and values.  Instead of acknowledging the 
social, institutional, and rhetorical variables that drive science, each 
discipline of science, viewed in isolation, is seen as primarily 
methodological.  Perhaps Cecil does not take seriously the notion 
that some of science’s best processes, assumptions, and values are not 
methodological.  On the other hand, Cecil realizes that the trial 
judge’s call for “a scientifically reliable approach” using “the scientific 
method” is not scientific at all, but is a legal standard dressed up as a 
scientific standard.  Therefore, a more cogent explanation is that 
Cecil does, in fact, recognize the instability and pragmatism of 
science.  On that point, Cecil does not completely share the Soldo 
court’s idealization of science.  Instead, Cecil admires the court’s 
unwitting idealization of law as better and more demanding than 
science.  We will return to Cecil’s idealization of law in the next 
section, but its contrast with Cohen’s idealization of science is 
evident.  In Cohen’s view, since science filters out too much of what 
law needs, law should apply lower  reliability standards than those of 
science itself. In Cecil’s modest view of science, on the other hand, 
since science’s own standards are too low for law, law should apply 
higher standards.  While we agree with Cecil’s modest view of science, 
we believe his idealization of law, as capable of doing a better job, 
leads him away from a proper focus on application and toward an 
abstract ideal of validity, albeit legal instead of scientific. 
Finally, a third type of idealization of science in post-trilogy 
scholarship takes the form of casual references to so-called “junk 
science.”  James Shellow, for example, in his commentary on the 
 
 87 See Cohen, supra note 16, at 963. 
 88 See Caudill & LaRue, supra note 25, at 24-36. 
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limits of cross-examination of experts, begins by identifying “junk 
scientists” who were supposed to be exposed in “Daubert and Kumho 
hearings,” who “[u]nfortunately . . . appear on the stand well-dressed 
and articulate,” and who “believe in their junk science.”89  Shellow 
subsequently refers to “the now legendary junk science,”90 but his use 
of the term “legendary” is more appropriate than he might realize.  
Professor Mansfield has already condemned the “campaign of 
sloganeering, employing such labels as ‘junk science’ . . . aimed at 
casting scorn on those who testified to opinions thought to warrant 
these labels.  It is embarrassing to concede that this kind of 
sloganeering may have influenced the course of the law.”91  The 
point, of course, is not that all proffered expertise is adequate.  There 
is widespread acknowledgement that some experts and some 
expertise are not worthy of the courtroom.  Rather, the “model that 
posits junk science as distinguishable from . . . “good science” . . . is a 
flexible, politically charged framework that . . . plays a strategic, 
rhetorical role in the agendas of many who attempt to address the 
pervasive perception of an ongoing legal crisis.”92 
As Professors Edmond and Mercer demonstrate, the “junk 
science” model relies on “untenable images of efficacy, methods, 
norms, and motivations as hallmarks of ‘good science.’”93  The term 
“junk science,” lacking any consistent meaning, functions more as an 
ideal or image for those who 
(i) oversimplify the relationship between scientific knowledge and 
technically efficacious outcomes;94 
(ii) view “factors like financial opportunism [as] hallmarks of junk 
science, [when] in reality such factors provide powerful motors 
for many fields of contemporary science”;95 
(iii) consider scientific norms prescribing that scientists be 
detached, impersonal, self-critical, and open-minded as “necessary 
 
 89 James M. Shellow, The Limits of Cross-Examination, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 317, 
317 (2003). 
 90 Id. at 319 (quoting Allen, supra note 12, at 5). 
 91 Mansfield, supra note 7, at 82. 
 92 Edmond & Mercer, supra note 54, && 1, 3-4. 
 93 Id. & 9. 
 94 See id. & 16 (“Any simple linkage between science and practice is . . . 
undermined when we consider the reworking and simplification of scientific 
knowledge as it moves from abstract theorizing into standardized forms sufficient to 
fulfill a technological function.”). 
 95 Id. & 23 (“Unlike the impression conveyed by junk science model proponents, 
in actuality scientists frequently find themselves in a competitive environment where 
strong emotional commitment to their views and sensitivity to finance and funding 
are essential to career progression—even academic and institutional survival.”). 
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feature[s] of doing scientific work”;96 and 
(iv) assume that “a simple, identifiable, universal scientific 
method . . . guides [scientific] activity.”97 
In short, the very mention of junk science, unless it is qualified 
immediately with carefully examined examples, signals a 
romanticization of science as method and a corresponding failure to 
acknowledge the social context of even the best science as constitutive. 
In recent appraisals of the use of forensic science in criminal 
cases, the recognition of the “social” as positive or fruitful is evident.  
Professor Margaret Berger, for example, describes DNA typing as 
“the by-product of cutting-edge science,” as opposed to “forensic 
specialties which originated within the law enforcement 
community . . . to facilitate investigations and prosecutions.”98  The 
distinction between cutting-edge science and “courtroom” science 
might appear to support an argument that the latter is “social”—
motivated, biased (toward prosecution), and interested—as opposed 
to the former as relatively objective or “natural.”  In her historical 
narrative concerning DNA typing, however, Berger speaks of that 
method’s universal ratification by the scientific community, of 
scientists serving on committees to monitor the use of DNA typing in 
trials, of reports issued by the National Academy of Sciences, of shifts 
in laboratory technologies, of impliedly valid disputes concerning 
“appropriate probabilities and . . . how they should be expressed,” of 
the need for proper collection and analysis of genetic markers, 
quality control, and documentation protocols in laboratories, and of 
“proficiency testing of laboratory personnel.”99  Two observations 
about this list can be made.  First, each of the listed phenomena is 
decidedly social, institutional, or rhetorical (not simply 
methodological): community ratification, committees, institutional 
reports, evolving technologies and protocols, disputes, document 
writing, and credentialing.  Second, these social features of DNA 
typing have generated good, not bad, science; without the elaborate 
social process that Berger documents, DNA typing would not have 
made the progress that it has.  Note, however, that Berger does not 
idealize nuclear DNA testing—”the gold standard for expert proof”—
because it “may, under some circumstances, produce results that are 
 
 96 Id. && 25-26 (citing MICHAEL MULKAY, SCIENCE AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
KNOWLEDGE 64 (1979)). 
 97 Id. && 28-29 (“[S]tandards of proof, models, acceptable error rates, and 
observation . . . vary substantially from one branch of science to the next.”). 
 98 Berger, supra note 37, at 1126. 
 99 Id. at 1126-29. 
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completely wrong.”100  Reliability in the abstract, therefore, is not 
enough.  For admissibility and sufficiency determinations, the focus 
should be on “what the evidence proves and how the trier of fact will 
use it.”101 
In his critique of experts who peddle “tainted or fraudulent 
science,” Professor Paul Giannelli offers a similar description of good 
science.102  Giannelli summarizes the recommendations of the 
Inspector General’s 1997 report on the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) laboratory, which criticized inaccurate, 
incompetent, and poorly documented testimony, as including: 
(1) seeking accreditation of the FBI laboratory by the American 
Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation 
Board; (2) requiring examiners . . . to have scientific 
backgrounds . . . (3) mandating the preparation . . . of separate 
reports instead of having one composite report . . . (4) 
establishing report review procedures . . . (5) preparing adequate 
case files . . . (6) monitoring court testimony . . . and (7) 
developing written protocols for scientific procedures.103 
Again, the keys to legitimate scientific inquiry are the social, not 
just methodological, aspects of science (institutional accreditation, 
credentialing, review of documentation, and procedural 
conventions).  Institutions, community oversight, persuasive 
documentation, and the social “capital” represented by credentials 
are the cure for mediocre science and the route to scientific progress.  
In light of these accounts, the counterargument, that the social, 
institutional, and rhetorical aspects of science are secondary to 
science’s real or methodological work (hypothesis, data, and testing), 
rings hollow. 
Finally, we should mention Professor Christopher Slobogin’s 
recent commentary on expertise in criminal cases, which concedes 
the difficulties faced by defendants using social scientists in the 
exclusionary post-trilogy regime (for example, that error rates are 
hard to generate because of multiple variables, and the practical and 
ethical limitations on experimentation).104  Slobogin notes that 
 
 100 Id. at 1140. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Giannelli, supra note 17, at 1107 (quoting BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL 
INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY 
CONVICTED 246 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103 Id. at 1108 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, THE 
FBI LABORATORY: AN INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED 
MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-RELATED AND OTHER CASES (1997)). 
 104 See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 108-16. 
 2004 EXPERT TESTIMONY 23 
“[r]esearch requires money[,]” and “[t]he state has more of it”:105 
 The state not only has more money, but it is better equipped, in 
an institutional sense, to use it. . . .  [T]he state is better able to 
anticipate the scientific issues that will arise and act accordingly.  
Indeed, Daubert and Kumho Tire have already stimulated massive 
federal efforts to validate the type of forensic evidence typically 
relied upon by the prosecution.106 
The resources of defense-oriented academic researchers “pale 
when compared to the government’s.”107  In this context, Slobogin is 
not criticizing prosecution-oriented science for its interest, bias, or 
motivation; rather, Slobogin contends that methodology needs 
institutional support.  Money and other resources are, almost always, 
conditions for the production of scientific expertise.108 
Given that most idealizations of science identified in this section 
are quite subtle, they resemble unfortunate tendencies more than 
dangerous narratives concerning courtroom expertise.  To illustrate, 
Professors Gross and Mnookin readily acknowledge that “the level of 
confidence the expert witness expresses” is as important as 
methodology,109 which helps refocus attention on the application 
phase rather than threshold reliability.  Nonetheless, as they begin to 
discuss non-scientific evidence, Gross and Mnookin observe: 
At least compared to alternative forms of knowledge-production, 
research science involves formalized methodological norms, 
articulated standards, and conscious research design.  By contrast, 
many forms of potential expert knowledge—from the clinical 
doctor’s diagnosis to the historian’s description to the tire safety 
expert’s analysis—are based on experience, tacit knowledge, even 
hunch.110 
While recognizing that qualitative differences surely exist 
between highly replicable research designs and mere theories based 
on interesting but minimal data, Gross and Mnookin hint that the 
best science rises above subjectivity.  The contrast is not so sharp, 
however, because “experience, tacit knowledge, [and] even hunch” 
alternatively generate our “formalized methodological norms, 
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articulated standards, and conscious research design.”111  Consensus 
concerning methodological norms and standards is tacit knowledge.  
Research designs draw on experience and sometimes rely on a hunch 
as to what might work better.  The appropriate distinction, therefore, 
is not between methodology and experience, but rather between 
experience that leads to promising research and experience that does 
not.  The unwitting attempt to sanitize science of its fruitful and 
supportive social context not only leads to a romanticized vision of 
the scientific enterprise, but unjustifiably minimizes the application 
phase’s significance.  The application phase is a social context 
wherein the practical goals and limitations of methodology and 
“reliability” are visible. 
A focus on the application phase of expertise is both appropriate 
and useful, so long as one maintains a modest view of both science 
and law.  In light of this thesis, we should also note that a modest view 
of science by itself—one without a focus on application and/or a 
modest view of law—is less than helpful.  This point can best be 
demonstrated by comparing three Seton Hall Symposium articles 
whose authors share a modest view of science.  Other than this shared 
viewpoint, however, these authors disagree and become side-tracked 
into positions that do not help solve the problems of admissibility of 
expertise in the courtroom. 
To illustrate, Professor Mansfield’s position epitomizes the 
modest view of science.  He was an early critic of Daubert’s emphasis 
on Popper’s falsifiability criterion,112 and remains convinced that 
adopting “science” as a legal category was “a fundamental error”: 
Daubert [held] that to be “science,” evidence had to be 
“scientifically valid” or “good science,” and that this sort of science 
could only be the result of the “scientific method.”  The truth is 
that . . . there is no clear understanding and agreement about 
what is meant by “science,” “good science” or “the scientific 
method.”113 
In response to recent concerns about “scientific validity” and 
reliability, a certain probative value is now required prior to 
admissibility.  For Mansfield, this requirement is “a grave impairment 
of jury trials,”114 and unnecessary because the rules of evidence 
already excluded evidence that might mislead the jury.115  Prior to 
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Daubert, admissibility, based solely on the expert’s qualification and 
the relevance of his testimony, was easier.116  Even Frye’s “general 
acceptance” criteria “appeared to be restricted to ‘novel’ scientific 
evidence.”117  But now, under the force of (i) powerful economic 
interests whose servants initiated the campaign against “junk science,” 
(ii) judges who want to be associated with prestigious scientific 
knowledge, (iii) scientists who disapprove of inferior courtroom 
science, and (iv) an ideological distrust of juries,118 we are left with a 
“conceptual muddle”119 and with “[c]onfusion and conflict.”120 
We admire Professor Mansfield’s modest assessment of science 
and the scientific method in his critique of Daubert,121 and will address 
what we perceive to be his idealization of law and especially the jury, 
in Part IV, below.  Notably, Professor Christopher Mueller, instead of 
criticizing Daubert, actually finds in that opinion a modest view of the 
scientific enterprise: 
[Alongside] an apparent belief that science is a static body of 
objective knowledge reflecting certainty . . . we also find in Daubert 
suggestions that (a) science is a process, hence anything but 
static; (b) scientific knowledge does not reflect certainty, but is 
uncertain and contingent; and (c) scientific expertise is affected 
by the forces that generate litigation, hence [it is] subjective in 
some respects, and socially constructed.122 
In contrast to Mansfield, however, Mueller argues that we need a 
Daubert-type validity standard, as “[w]e can make the judgment that 
not all evidence that is presented as science, even by qualified 
witnesses, is of such quality that it can be relied upon . . . .  We can 
believe that such evidence varies in quality, and that sometimes it is 
not reliable enough.”123  Mueller, predictably, observes that juries 
“have trouble with complex cases, and with scientific evidence,”124 and 
that more educated and experienced judges “can do better than 
juries in separating what should count from what should not.”125  Even 
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though Mueller and Mansfield agree that “reliability is not an all-or-
nothing concept, but a relative concept,”126 that assessment standing 
alone does not lead to agreement concerning the vices and virtues of 
the Daubert trilogy. 
Indeed, a third possibility might follow from a modest 
assessment of the scientific enterprise, namely the (technically 
correct, but easily exaggerated) view that mainstream science 
sometimes produces “junk” and, impliedly, novel science is often 
superior: 
The real issue is determining what junk science is, especially 
during an era of constantly evolving scientific developments.  
Remember, it was not too long ago that . . . [a]rguments were 
made that research linking cigarettes to lung cancer were “junk.”  
Similarly, . . . [i]t was not until the late seventies that the world 
learned that [asbestos] was lethal in dust form.  Again, early 
studies . . . would have been labeled “junk” science by today=s 
standards.127 
Here, the views of Baumeister and Capone are distinct from those of 
both Mueller, whose validity standard makes no distinction between 
mainstream and novel science, and Mansfield, who sees the utility of 
a validity standard only with respect to novel science.128  For 
Baumeister and Capone, reliability standards are dangerous; lives are 
lost to diseases like cancer and asbestosis when “incriminating expert 
evidence [is] subjected to a preliminary review by a trial court 
today[.]”129 
Apart from demonstrating why a modest assessment of science 
does not entail any particular view of the Daubert trilogy, the 
foregoing examples also variously illustrate both why we should focus 
on application, not on science in the abstract, and why a modest view 
of science must be accompanied by a modest view of law.  We have no 
criticism of Mansfield’s view of science.  However, his idealization of 
the jury, discussed in Part IV, below, interferes with his ability to offer 
guidance to judges and lawyers.  In effect, Mansfield posits that the 
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Daubert trilogy is hopeless: misguided, unpredictable, and 
unconstitutional.130 
Mueller, on the other hand, is wildly hopeful.  We have no 
criticism of Mueller’s initial and overt modest assessment of science—
that scientific evidence offers possibilities and probabilities, and 
“much scientific knowledge is fluid and contestable.”131  Two aspects 
of Mueller’s analysis, nevertheless, concern us.  At the outset, Mueller 
appears to have no proposals for reform.  He defends the Daubert 
trilogy’s restrictive regime on the bases that judges are more 
competent than juries, that gatekeeping is necessary for reliability, 
and that the Court’s definition of science is balanced.132  Nevertheless, 
as discussed in Part IV, below, Mueller rejects the abuse-of-discretion 
standard on the basis of an idealized notion of appellate review.  
More to the point, with respect to his initial modest view of science, 
Mueller’s analysis proceeds toward a subtle idealization of science.  
This takes the form of downplaying the social, institutional, and 
rhetorical aspects of science in favor of its methodological rigor.  For 
example, at the end of his defense of Daubert, Mueller confirms his 
seemingly modest view of the scientific enterprise: 
Behind the numbers [the product of analysis of the quantification 
of scientific data] are more and real uncertainties—the ones that 
go with designing tests, selecting cohorts, trying to eliminate 
differences apart from the factor in issue that might account for 
observed differences. . . .  [I]t is hard or impossible to eliminate 
confounding variables, and . . . even promising results might not 
be replicable. . . .  And there [are] self-serving human 
motivations . . . .133 
These aspects of science, however, are not presented by Mueller 
as characteristics of genuine science; rather, they are reasons to be 
cautious, and reasons why “science insists on impressive numbers.”134  
Even more telling, Mueller’s footnote to the above quotation does 
not cite to historians, philosophers, or sociologists of science who 
elucidate the inevitable social, rhetorical, and institutional aspects of 
“good” science.  Instead, Mueller refers to a New York Times article 
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decrying epidemiology as “crude and inexact,” and to a Chronicle of 
Higher Education article about the seven signs of “bogus science”—
pitching claims to the media (rather than to peer-reviewed journals), 
identifying a powerful establishment that suppresses novel research, 
claiming hard-to-detect effects, and so forth.135  A distinction, 
therefore, between “genuine” and “junk” science—and not merely 
between “better” and “worse” science—creeps back into Mueller’s 
analysis.  In defending Daubert against critics who argue on 
philosophical grounds that the case is analytically defective and 
incoherent, Mueller praises the mediation or compromise between 
the goals of objectivity and the more modest views of Popper and 
Kuhn136—neither of whom are representative of contemporary 
science and technology studies, the sociology of scientific knowledge, 
or of rhetoricians and social historians of science.  All of this suggests 
that Mueller does not take seriously the view that all of science, even 
as it succeeds in modeling nature and making accurate predictions, is 
social, historical, and rhetorical.  Although this idealization of science 
is subtle, it is just enough to prevent Mueller from seeing the 
problem with focusing on demarcation and admissibility rather than 
application. 
IV. MODEST VERSUS IDEALIZED VIEWS OF LAW 
In the Seton Hall Symposium, some solutions to the perceived 
challenges (for lawyers and judges) generated by the trilogy often 
took the form of idealizing a particular element of the trial—perhaps 
the process of appellate review, the trial judge, the jury, or even the 
capacity of experts to communicate appropriate legal standards to 
the jury.  Like idealizations of science, idealizations of law tend to 
deflect attention away from the application phase.  In the “case at 
hand,” notions of reliability and validity intersect with confidence 
levels and the pragmatic goals and limitations of scientific inquiry.  
Moreover, just as idealizations of science are bolstered by 
downplaying or demonizing (as unscientific) the social aspects of 
science, idealizations of particular features of law often rely on 
demonizations of other aspects: appellate panels correct the unruly 
discretion of trial judges; trial judges correct the deficiencies of the 
jury; juries correct adversarial excess or exaggerated expertise, and so 
forth.  Failure to recognize the realistic limits of law, as well as 
science, will result in impractical reform proposals. 
In his defense of the trilogy, Professor Mueller provides a 
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valuable “reality check.”137  In an acute dissection of professorial 
fallacies in post-trilogy scholarship, Mueller illustrates how some of 
the “bad” rules supposedly established in the trilogy simply do not 
exist.138  But then, in a less realistic moment, Mueller suggests that 
appellate review of admissibility decisions (concerning expertise) 
should be de novo.139  Mueller is convinced that the abuse-of-discretion 
standard, confirmed in Joiner and Kumho Tire, will lead to an 
unfortunate lack of uniformity: 
[I]ssues relating to the validity of theories and techniques 
transcend the facts of individual cases.  This observation 
applies . . . to the question whether DNA profiling can reliably 
identify a blood or fluid sample as having very likely come from 
one person . . . .  It applies to the question whether proffered 
statistical proof should satisfy the standard that scientists would 
require, to the question whether differential diagnosis[,] . . . 
animal studies . . . [or] . . . similarities between . . . chemical 
structures . . . can prove causation.  Questions of this magnitude 
need steadier guidance than the abuse-of-discretion standard 
provides, and the answers that courts reach should be applied in 
similar cases. . . .  140 
In our view, the phrase “abuse of discretion” is indeed notorious 
for its elasticity of meaning; appellate courts regularly reverse trial 
judges and administrative agencies under this heading.  Lack of 
uniformity, however, in deciding cases is not an evil unless the cases 
are indistinguishable.  If the appropriate question in cases involving 
scientific expertise is primarily how science is “brought to bear” in a 
particular case, and not scientific reliability in general, then the 
reliability ruling in any particular case is likely to be easily 
distinguishable from other rulings. 
At the Seton Hall Symposium, the Honorable Chief Judge 
Gibbons of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
now retired, engaged in a more careful and nuanced discussion of 
“the respective roles of trial courts and appellate courts with respect 
to the admissibility of . . . expert . . . evidence . . . .”141  Judge Gibbons 
begins his discussion by noting three complications concerning 
appellate review of evidentiary rulings—namely, the harmless-error 
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rule, the trial judge’s fact-finding on preliminary questions, and the 
abuse-of-discretion standard.142  Judge Gibbons then contrasts these 
complications with the rather straightforward legal principle that 
appellate review of a summary judgment or a directed verdict is 
plenary.143  The contrast between review of evidentiary rulings and the 
plenary review of summary judgments is generally defensible.  As 
Judge Gibbons points out, however, a trial judge’s decision to exclude 
an expert’s testimony may remove all of the evidence on a critical 
element of a claim.144  In such a case, there is little or no practical 
difference between the evidentiary ruling and a summary judgment 
ruling. 
One response to this difficulty would be to argue, like Professor 
Mueller does, that the distinction should be abolished.  Judge 
Gibbons is tempted to simply do so.145  But instead, he reviews the 
relevant precedent in his own circuit, especially the opinions of Judge 
Becker, and concludes that the scope of review for evidentiary rulings 
“is not a simple matter.”146  While criticizing Joiner’s hard line as a 
“pure, simple, unvarnished abuse of discretion” standard of review,147 
Judge Gibbons identifies ambiguities in that opinion due to “the 
absence of a nuanced definition of abuse of discretion, a definition 
including legal error, procedural irregularity, disregard of evidence 
that should have been considered, and clearly erroneous factual 
determinations.  Any one of these ought to lead to a statement that 
there was an abuse of discretion.”148  Moreover, explaining that Rules 
702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence149 “require the 
determination of what, in most or many cases, will be a mixed 
question of law and fact,”  Judge Gibbons concludes that review of 
such determinations should be plenary.150  If the abuse-of-discretion 
“standard” is already as elastic as Judge Gibbons claims, however, his 
conclusion need not follow. 
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Professor Mueller argues for plenary review on the bases that (i) 
“issues relating to the validity of theories and techniques transcend 
the facts of individual cases” and require uniformity;151 (ii) three (or 
more) minds are better than one;152 and (iii) trial judges need 
guidance.153  Nevertheless, Mueller concedes that with respect to the 
application phase, “some degree of deference” to trial judges is 
warranted: 
FRE 702 indicates that judges are to consider “principles and 
methods” and the sufficiency of underlying “facts or data,” and 
also the question whether the expert “has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts,” and Kumho Tire makes it clear 
that the focus is the “task at hand” . . . .  To the extent that the 
admissibility decision actually focuses . . . on . . . laboratory 
protocol . . . or . . . discrepancy in the data . . . some degree of 
deference to the decision of the trial judge is in order.  It is with 
larger questions, including those of theory and technique . . . that 
closer scrutiny is warranted.154 
On the other hand, if the action is in the application, then most 
cases require discretion.  Mueller’s plenary review is justified only by 
his twin idealization of the appellate judiciary as more relaxed and 
reflective155 and of science as a source of transcendent knowledge of 
valid theories and techniques.  Judge Gibbons’ idealization of 
appellate review is more measured.  But unlike Professor Mueller, 
Judge Gibbons justifies plenary review especially in cases mixing law 
and fact—in his words, “in many if not most cases.”156  Both Mueller 
and Judge Gibbons are correct as to some cases.  Still, as the all-purpose 
solution, invoking plenary review is an oversimplification based on an 
idealization of the appellate judiciary.  Although “abuse of discretion” 
is a flexible concept worthy of Professor Mueller’s and Judge 
Gibbons’ critical attention, plenary review is also a flexible practice. 
In addition to idealizations of appellate review (to correct 
deficient judges), some scholars at the Seton Hall Symposium 
idealized the jury.  Professor Mansfield, for example, argued that the 
rules of evidence have been, are, and should be oriented to the 
 
 151 Mueller, supra note 6, at 1020. 
 152 See id. at 1021. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 1022. 
 155 See id. at 1021 (“[A]ppellate review goes forward in a setting less subject to 
severe scheduling pressures. . . .  Reviewing courts can even take judicial notice of 
technical books, articles, and other materials.”). 
 156 Gibbons, supra note 10, at 139. 
 32 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:001 
admission of all relevant evidence.157  Thus, the trilogy’s reliability 
requirement for admissibility ends up as an embarrassing error.158  
Moreover, given that the reliability requirement leads judges to 
invade the province of the jury, for Mansfield, this error has 
constitutional dimensions.159 
Mansfield’s idealization of the jury is clearest in his distinction 
between Rule 403 and the trilogy’s reliability requirement.160  
Mansfield sees Rule 403 as directed against the evils that 
the jury will ignore the substantive law, the jury will disregard the 
burden of  proof, the jury will be swept away by emotion, and so 
forth.  These evils can be seen as such and taken into account 
through the exclusion of evidence without attacking the very 
reason for having [a] jury trial: that the verdict may reflect beliefs 
about the world held by ordinary people and the working of 
average intelligences.161 
The distinction, however, between the listed “evils” and the reason for 
jury trials is difficult to sustain.  Suppose an attorney attempts to 
inflame the jury’s passion so that jurors will “ignore the substantive 
law” and “disregard the burden of proof.”  Why might the attorney 
succeed?  Would it not be because jurors had “beliefs about the 
world” that would lead them to be susceptible to a passionate appeal?  
“Inflammatory” remarks only work by appealing to stereotypes held 
by ordinary people.  Thus, insisting that we preserve ordinary beliefs 
about the world seems naive. 
To bolster his idealization of the jury, Mansfield also demonizes 
those who hope the trilogy’s reliability requirements will improve the 
accuracy of adjudication.  As Mansfield sees it, the trilogy is the 
product of 
powerful economic interests[,] . . . the desire of some judges to be 
associated with science, . . . the anger and scorn [of] elite 
scientists [toward law’s use of ‘bad science’ and] an ideology, far 
from decisively eliminated in our political debates, which cannot 
see the sense in entrusting to twelve persons picked at random 
from the general population important and difficult questions of 
fact.162 
Singled out as an ideologue, Professor Allen is allegedly guilty of the 
fourth count in Mansfield’s indictment.  Allen’s emphasis on 
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accuracy in trials rests on the “conviction that jury verdicts are not as 
accurate as other forms of adjudication and that there are no good 
policy reasons why an inferior form of fact-finding should be 
accepted.”163 
Mansfield’s modest view of science is one of the best.164  His 
exaggeration of the jury’s role, however, interferes with his ability to 
recognize the virtues of Kumho Tire’s focus on the jury trial’s 
application stage.  Though Mansfield suggests that Kumho Tire is 
incompatible with respect for the jury, one can admire both Kumho 
Tire and the jury system: Judge plus jury is superior to judge or jury 
alone.  The rules of evidence, enforced by a judge, can lead to 
presenting better evidence to a jury than otherwise would be 
presented.  Better evidence is more likely to lead to better decisions.  
The difficulty lies in formulating the best working relationship 
between counsel, judge, and jury. 
Insofar as Baumeister and Capone’s idealization of the jury relies 
on the argument that judges and juries are equally inept when it 
comes to science, it perhaps should not be referred to as an 
“idealization.”  In their words, “[w]hile there is little research data in 
the area, studies suggest that the ability of judges and jurors to make 
correct inferences from probability data are both poor, and 
specifically, that the judges are not superior to jurors.”165  Instead of 
acknowledging, as Sanders does,166 the conflicting evidence regarding 
juror confusion with respect to scientific testimony, Baumeister and 
Capone select their sources to claim, in contradiction to the above 
assertion, that “[t]here is simply ‘no evidence that juries are 
incompetent to evaluate expert testimony’ or that if permitted to 
review all expert evidence . . . that there is a greater potential for 
unsupported, exorbitant damage verdicts.”167 
To be fair, Baumeister and Capone offer several concrete 
suggestions to address the problem of juror confusion, including 
better lawyer communication and better jury instructions, providing a 
written synopsis to the jury, back-to-back expert testimony (to allow 
comparisons between conflicting experts), and allowing juror 
questions.  These suggestions, nevertheless, are lost in a polemic 
against the “chilling” and “erosive” effect of judicial gatekeeping on 
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the adversary system.168  “[Daubert has] effectively weakened the 
parties’ control over litigation . . . and eliminated the trial judge’s 
‘neutrality’ by empowering them [sic] to exclude critical evidence 
from the jury’s consideration . . . .”169  Baumeister and Capone suspect 
that the current restrictive regime, which is not in their view justified 
by the texts of the trilogy, has more to do with judicial desire to 
reduce case dockets and “an attempt by large corporations to deflect 
some of society’s more difficult issues.”170 
In a similar but more sophisticated argument that plaintiffs in 
civil suits are treated unfairly, Professor Cohen suggests that the 
trilogy’s reliability standard is too high.171  Since a scientist’s “burden 
of proof” for causation within the scientific community is higher than 
“preponderance of the evidence,” Cohen contends, it is 
inappropriate in a civil trial.172  Though he proceeds by focusing on 
epidemiology, Cohen makes clear that his argument applies to any 
science that uses similar statistical reasoning.173  Unfortunately, 
Cohen’s argument oversimplifies the complexities of legal judgments; 
as a result, he ends up idealizing the burden of proof and proposing 
an impractical framework for civil trials. 
To be concrete, Cohen’s argument can be restated by supposing 
that one wants to know whether eating broccoli causes cancer.  
(President Bush the Elder had different reasons for not wanting to 
eat it, but suppose he had asked the National Institutes of Health to 
investigate the question.)  A scientist would first assume that broccoli 
does not cause cancer.  This assumption is the so-called “null 
hypothesis.”174  At this point, there is no deviation from the legal 
system, which also starts with the assumption that a civil defendant 
will not owe the plaintiff any money until the plaintiff comes forward 
with proof.  Next, the scientist would investigate the incidence of 
cancer among those who eat broccoli and those who do not.  The 
empirical data may well show that cancer is higher among broccoli 
eaters than among those who shun it, but this difference could be the 
result of chance—the random nature of many events.  To rule out 
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chance, epidemiologists set a high standard; typically, the odds must 
be better than twenty to one in favor of the broccoli–cancer link 
before they will assume that the null hypothesis has been disproved.175 
What should courts make of this twenty-to-one standard?  
Neither Cohen nor we would say that epidemiologists are not doing 
their job well—they know their business better than we do.  
Convinced that the legal system cannot integrate scientific 
procedures into the courtroom, Cohen would have scientists alter 
their normal criteria when they testify in court.176  Cohen has based 
his proposal on an idealization of the clarity with which lawyers, 
judges, and jurors understand the burden of proof.  “More probable 
than not” is given the standard law school translation of “greater than 
fifty percent,” and that fifty percent is assumed to mean the same 
thing that fifty percent means in statistics.  Not only does this move 
radically oversimplify the process of analysis that ordinary people use 
when they decide something has been proven,177 but it leads Cohen to 
suggest that the scientific expert should testify as a non-scientist.  To 
illustrate, Cohen’s model for expert testimony includes the following: 
I would not proclaim in an academic paper the existence of a link 
between the medication and high blood pressure because the 
[probability that data will suggest a link even when there is none] 
is greater than 5%[;] . . . rather, I would write that the link is 
suggested by the data but does [not] meet stringent scientific 
standards designed to minimize . . . proclamation of inaccurate 
findings . . . .  But you have not asked me to present an academic 
paper . . . .  In this setting, I would set the threshold somewhat 
lower, which I believe more accurately reflects the balance of 
considerations in this setting.178 
The entire script of the model testimony—over 500 words—is 
difficult to follow.  In fact, the script could even be utilized to settle 
the empirical debate over juror confusion in favor of jury critics; that 
is, Cohen seems to join those who idealize the jury.  More 
importantly, it makes little sense to use scientists as courtroom 
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“expert” legal theorists who proclaim reliability standards that are not 
based on scientific methodology. 
Joe Cecil is more generous in his response to Cohen, crediting 
Cohen with “demonstrat[ing] that the conservative values implicit in 
declaring the existence of an [epidemiological] effect place an 
awesome barrier in the path of the plaintiff who wishes to present 
expert evidence to the jury.”179 On the other hand, Cecil believes the 
problem of reliability standards is more complicated than Cohen 
realizes, since sciences other than epidemiology “endorse other value 
systems . . . requir[ing] judges to resolve issues that the sciences 
themselves have left unresolved.”180  Indeed, referencing Cohen’s 
alertness to the danger of scientific values overriding legal values, 
Cecil begins his own analysis of scientific expertise by stating: 
 If only it were so easy.  The problem is that there is not just one 
science and not one scientific method. . . .  [T]he values of 
science vary across the individual disciplines.  Each one has its 
own norms and standards that vary greatly in the rigor they 
impose in declaring a finding to be “scientific knowledge.”181 
Then, just as the reader is convinced that Cecil will not oversimplify 
the problem of reliability, he changes the question.  Cecil 
recommends that judges focus on sufficiency rather than reliability: 
The courts cannot resolve the diverse views and values that 
characterize the scientific academy; one science’s accepted 
methodology may be another’s ipse dixit.  A court can, however, 
specify a minimum threshold [of sufficiency] for admissible 
scientific evidence, and make clear that in doing so it is 
establishing a legal standard and not assessing the ephemeral 
concept of “scientific validity.”182 
Given his use of the word “sufficiency,” Cecil seems to suggest 
that the best solution to the problems generated by the trilogy may be 
to stop worrying about reliability and focus instead on whether 
evidence is sufficient to support a verdict.183  Or, perhaps Cecil is 
suggesting a special use of the term “sufficiency” to denote a legal 
 
 179 Cecil, supra note 43, at 968. 
 180 Id. at 969. 
 181  Id. at 968 (responding to Cohen, and also to Sanders, supra note 21, who 
attempt to “anticipate the shortcomings of jurors in assessing complex evidence . . . 
in a way that strengthens the accuracy of the process”). 
 182 Id. at 985-86. 
 183 See Nance, supra note 43, at 214 (“Faced with the very difficult task of coming 
up with a coherent scheme of . . . reliability . . . there is some tendency for trial 
judges to try instead to answer a different, more readily answerable . . . question. . . .  
Courts might, for example, treat the admissibility decision as a sufficiency decision 
on the merits . . . .”). 
 2004 EXPERT TESTIMONY 37 
standard for admissibility of expertise that is different from scientific 
reliability.  In either event, we fail to understand why anyone would 
believe that the problem of sufficiency is more tractable than 
“reliability.”  The assumption seems to be that judges can 
unproblematically handle such legal questions—an apparent 
idealization of trial judges.  Cecil, however, has simply re-labeled the 
very same problem: Will not a judge deciding sufficiency have to 
decide whether the scientific evidence is reliable?  Indeed, if we all 
agreed with Cecil that courts should specify minimum admissibility 
thresholds,184 every debate in the field of post-trilogy discourse would 
continue to flourish. 
Cecil’s analysis provides another answer to the question of how 
to ensure that only reliable evidence is admitted: to place more 
responsibility on the trial judge.  Professor Faigman’s similar view is, 
perhaps, remarkable for its idealization of the trial judge’s role.  With 
respect to those scholars who tend to idealize the jury and seek “to 
retain a prominent role for jurors in the evaluation of scientific 
evidence,”185 Faigman is dismissive: 
 The issue of judge versus jury . . . is largely irrelevant.  It is the 
judge’s task to evaluate the validity of proffered expert testimony, 
and that is all there is to it. . . .  The only question is what is the 
nature of the judge’s job in this regard—the rest will be done by 
the jury.186 
According to Faigman, moreover, trial judges should not simply 
attend to what happens to expertise in court, but also “to what 
occurred before the expertise reached the courtroom and . . . what 
might happen to the expertise subsequently.”187  While we agree that 
an “admissibility decision necessarily requires a policy judgment,”188 
insofar as the scientific community does not provide answers to legal 
questions, Faigman believes “that the evidentiary determination 
regarding expert evidence must . . . integrate into its foundational 
premises [ ] the culture of the scientific method.”189  Since we reject 
any notion of “legal” science disengaged from actual scientific 
practices, even that sounds agreeable.  But for Faigman’s trial judge, 
it is a two-way street.  Judges should not only “ask whether better 
evidence is available, [but] whether better evidence should be 
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available.”190  If handwriting experts lack data, “[t]he issue is whether 
the courts should expect the scientific community (broadly defined) 
to have produced better data on handwriting.”191  Faigman’s trial 
judges, therefore, have the responsibility of “consider[ing] the 
ramifications of their admissibility decisions both in regard to the 
development of the respective expertise and in terms of the costs of 
errors . . . for society at-large.”192  Anticipating criticism of this tall 
order, Faigman concedes that “many will complain about the 
difficulty of the task.  It is true that [this] complicates the judge’s job.  
But so be it.  Science is complicated.”193 
Faigman’s analysis is directed against Professor Nance, who is 
particularly attentive to the limited “institutional capacities” of the 
judge and jury.194  Nance posits that problems generated by the 
Daubert trilogy are best approached by “disavow[ing] a binary, all-or-
nothing concept of reliability”—or sufficiency, testability, or validity—
”in favor of a gradational concept.”195  We agree that the “fundamental 
problem” for the doctrines concerning scientific expertise “is how to 
map from a gradational epistemic conception of reliability to a dichotomous 
legal choice on admissibility.”196  The key to Nance’s aphorism and to 
understanding the complexity of expertise in the courtroom is the 
distinction between legal concepts and legal choices.  Fundamental 
legal concepts of evidence are indeed gradational.  For example, 
relevance under Rule 401, or an issue such as “motive,” is not easily 
sorted into a “Yes or No” dichotomy.  Sometimes the category is 
clearly a “Yes,” sometimes clearly a “No,” and often times is 
somewhere in between.  Given that the law is forced to make morally, 
legally, or politically painful dichotomous choices, we are tempted to 
imagine that the concepts guiding our choices draw sharper 
distinctions than they do.  In that light, we happily endorse Nance’s 
general thesis, which may lightheartedly be hyperbolized as the First 
Commandment of evidence scholarship: Thou shalt not dichotomize, 
except from necessity.  And so, Nance argues: 
(i) that the reliability determination, necessitated by current 
jurisprudence but necessarily gradational, involves more than, 
and therefore cannot be stabilized by, the requirements of 
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relevance or expert qualifications;197 
(ii) that “sufficient reliability,” “testing,” “peer review and 
publication,” and “low error rates” are as gradational as 
“reliability,” and therefore provide it no stability;198 
(iii) that deference to scientific validity, itself a gradational 
concept, provides no stability (and there is no good reason to 
defer even if it did);199 and 
(iv) that almost all imaginable dichotomies developed as proxies 
for reliability without deference to science seem to be incompatible 
“with established doctrine and institutional capacities.”200 
Nonetheless, “there is a germ of insight in such substitute 
approaches”—namely, Nance’s idea that we should “think in terms of 
comparative evaluation of . . . reliability.”201  For Nance, this leads to a 
“better evidence” requirement—the appropriate basis for exclusion is 
that better evidence is available.202 
In the opening pages of Nance’s study on the concept of 
reliability, he engages in some interesting “boundary work” by 
indicating his position on some of the debates in post-trilogy 
scholarship.  First, Nance states that “concerns about jury misuse of 
expertise are less important than concerns about controlling 
advocates . . . .”203  Thus, in the debate over juror shortcomings, 
Nance sides with those who subtly idealize the jury (and subtly blame 
lawyers and experts who need controlling).  This position is often 
accompanied by a critique of the Rule 702 reliability requirement204 as 
perhaps too restrictive.205  Nance’s entire purpose, however, is to 
provide “a workable interpretation of the reliability requirement in 
Rule 702.”206  Second, in passing, Nance mentions that “greater use of 
court-appointed experts [ ] may well be more important to the 
administration of justice” than his own interpretive argument.207  His 
statement betrays not only humility, but also a subtle idealization of 
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science as relatively objective if you can just get it out of the hands of 
advocates.  Such a move is often accompanied by distrust of the jury.  
In Nance’s case, however, his romantic image of the jury is 
counterbalanced by his romantic image of science.  He is able 
rhetorically to proceed as if he is between the extremes of post-trilogy 
scholarship.  Indeed, Nance subsequently takes the position that legal 
norms of reliability need not correspond to scientific norms of 
reliability.208  This approach is typical of those who idealize law as 
capable of setting its own reliability standards.  But when he contends 
that “[s]cientific validity, as understood by scientists, should not be 
considered necessary in all cases for adjudicative helpfulness,”209 
Nance is not adopting a modest view of science.  Instead, Nance 
glamorizes the notion of “scientifically well-grounded conclusions”210 
as perhaps too high a goal for, and therefore irrelevant with respect 
to, the courtroom.  In this Article, we have attempted to avoid 
idealization of law or science, focusing on application.  In sharp 
contrast, Nance idealizes law and science.  He worries that the focus 
on the “task at hand” would, if “pressed to its logical conclusion . . . 
make determinations of reliability all but impossible, for the 
particular task at hand in a lawsuit is never replicated in research.”211 
Still, there is much in Nance’s study which we admire.  He (i) 
rejects the notion of a “threshold of reliability” as a blind alley;212 (ii) 
acknowledges the “disagreement among scientists and philosophers 
of science regarding the norms of scientific disciplines”;213 and (iii) 
recognizes that in the absence of a universal standard of validity, the 
scientific “community has developed dichotomous rules of thumb 
that, while over- and under-inclusive in some cases, roughly serve to 
further” the interests of science.214  Thus, Nance reaches an 
appropriately modest assessment of the scientific enterprise.  As to his 
analysis of the courts’ capacity to discern reliability, Nance offers 
some modest recommendations that follow from his “gradational” 
thesis.  Few would find his proposals controversial.  For example, 
Nance states that “[c]urrent practice is often overly generous to 
proponents in allowing opinions on case-specific material facts, 
ultimate or not, when those facts are not within the personal 
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knowledge of the expert.”215  In other words, Nance advocates more 
rigorous enforcement of the traditional rule that confined an 
expert’s opinion to the scope of his or her expertise (for example, an 
internist may not have expertise in oncology).216  We think that such 
traditional principles enhance the focus on application. 
Nance also condenses another version of the “scope of 
expertise” principle, explaining: “Many claims to science are really 
assertions of policy wrapped in the guise of science.”217  Nance, like 
Professor Faigman, from whom Nance borrowed this language,218 
identifies a difficult and non-obvious aspect of the “scope” principle.  
Traditionally, this aspect took the form of a prohibition against 
experts instructing the jury on matters of law.  To illustrate, when an 
expert opines that Practice X is safe while Practice Y is not, there is 
always a danger that the expert is confusing the normative with the 
statistical.219  The temptation to permit experts to go beyond science 
and to broach matters of policy is powerful, and Nance’s advice is 
consistent with the views of those scholars who focus on degrees of 
confidence by experts. 
Alternatively, consider Professor Imwinkelried’s criticism of 
Nance’s version of the ancient “best evidence rule”: Proffered 
expertise should be evaluated in comparison with alternative 
expertise, and excluded only when more reliable expertise is 
reasonably available to the proponent and not to the opponent.220  
Imwinkelried agrees that the “reliability-is-relative” (or “gradational”) 
principle works with respect to the validity of an expert’s specified 
theory or technique, the particular use of the expertise by a lawyer, 
and the definiteness or degree of certitude of the expert’s opinion.221  
Nevertheless, Imwinkelried observes that when Nance attempts to 
extend his thesis by invoking a best evidence rule, he begins to 
 
 215 Id. at 242-43. 
 216 In response, Professor Imwinkelried endorses this part of Nance’s argument, 
albeit in different terms.  See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Relativity of Reliability, 34 
SETON HALL L. REV. 269, 277-78 (2003) (“The degree of allowable definiteness of the 
expert’s final opinion should vary with the reliability foundation laid by the expert’s 
proponent.”). 
 217 Nance, supra note 43, at 245 (quoting DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE 
USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 71 (1999)). 
 218 See id. 
 219 The well-known opinion of Justice Learned Hand in The T. J. Hooper is the locus 
classicus for this distinction.  See 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). 
 220 See Imwinkelried, supra note 216, at 279 (citing Nance, supra note 43, at 237). 
 221 See id. at 269 (stating that “Professor Nance . . . constructs a persuasive case that 
there is no invariant reliability threshold or uniform, minimum reliability level” for 
admissibility). 
 42 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:001 
idealize the courtroom:222 
The proposal multiplies the number of foundational issues . . . 
before [the] final ruling . . . .  The judge must decide: (1) 
whether the proponent’s evidence is “reliable”; (2) whether other 
expert techniques address the same question; (3) whether those 
techniques are better . . . ; (4) whether a better technique is 
reasonably available to the proponent [and] (5) . . . to the 
opponent; and (6) whether the proponent is a repeat player.  The 
administration of this rule during a jury trial will necessitate 
either horrendously long sidebar conferences or prolonged 
recesses.223 
As we agree with Imwinkelried that Nance takes his relativity 
principle too far, we obviously disagree with Faigman that Nance does 
not go far enough.224  Faigman, even more than Nance, idealizes the 
competence of judges well beyond what is reasonable to expect.  
Faigman would have the trial judge participate in the culture of 
science, and consider the effect that judicial decisions have on 
creating incentives for developing better science.225  Indeed, Faigman 
correctly argues that judicial decisions will offer incentives to out-of-
court players in the game of science.226  Nevertheless, it does not 
follow that judges should attempt to construct decisions that 
maximize the social utility of science. 
As our review of post-trilogy discourse demonstrates, the 
idealizations of particular aspects of law—of appellate panels, of 
juries, and of trial judges—has resulted in impractical proposals.  
Sometimes, as with Professor Mansfield, idealization of the jury 
interferes with the ability to appreciate Kumho Tire’s emphasis on the 
“case at hand.”  For Mansfield, any reliability standard, even one that 
realistically acknowledges the pragmatic character of the scientific 
enterprise and the diversity of methodologies, poses a threat to the 
jury’s role.227  With respect to the other scholars discussed in this 
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Article, idealization of appellate review or the trial judge also deflects 
attention away from the application phase, because the difficult 
problem of evaluating science is evaded by imagining an arbiter 
above the fray.  In our view, the application phase includes fallible, 
but typically competent, lawyers and their experts, trial judges, juries, 
and appellate judges, each of whom has a corrective role to play.  
Neither demonizing nor idealizing any one of them is necessary (nor 
helpful), and avoiding such tendencies keeps the focus on the 
production of evidence for the case at hand. 
V. CONCLUSION 
[T]hree points come [through] clearly from Kumho Tire: First, a 
court must review the reliability of the proffered expertise 
specifically as it applies to the task for which it is being utilized in 
the litigation in which it is offered, not in some more global 
sense.  Second, a court is obliged to . . . select the most 
appropriate criteria of reliability for the kind of expertise being 
proffered, given the circumstances of its generation in the 
particular case. . . .  Third, . . . the presence or absence of one or 
more [of the Daubert factors] is not necessarily dispositive of 
sufficient reliability to gain admission.228 
Possibly because of the danger that the law may ignore “global” 
reliability, some evidence scholars resist the current focus on the 
“task at hand”; recall Professor Allen’s concern, echoed by Professor 
Moreno, that “without global reliability, one has gibberish.”229  Even 
among scientists, however, “reliability” is an ephemeral concept230 
and, in both global and local contexts, a question of degree.231 
Accordingly, the task of establishing global reliability in a particular 
case is impractical.  Global reliability is no guarantee that a particular 
application by an expert is reliable.232  Even when a “global warrant” is 
unavailable, a particular application, if accompanied by an 
appropriate “level of confidence,” can assist a jury.233 
Reliability, nevertheless, is not so vague as to be useless.  We 
reject both the idealization of science (or scientific methodology) as 
a source of uncontroversial knowledge (or standards), as well as 
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idealizations of law that seem to render scientific standards 
superfluous.  Between those poles lies a balanced respect for both law 
and science that allows simultaneous acknowledgement of their 
practical goals and limitations.  In many important respects, science 
differs from law.  Law may govern and regulate a field of science, but 
does much more.  Likewise, science does more than produce useful 
knowledge for law.  Nonetheless, both fields share the characteristics 
of a social institution: both are communities with (albeit distinct) 
conventions, consensus-building techniques, rhetorical strategies, 
gatekeeping procedures, and internal debates.  When an expert is 
judged as to whether his or her application is reliable, an immodest 
view of science may lead to an unjustified restrictiveness.  In contrast, 
those who possess modest views of science are not surprised by 
degrees of reliability, uncertainty, scientific conflict, alternative 
explanations, mere probabilities, incomplete data, or the funding of 
research.234  The other extreme, however, is just as impractical—
namely, the expectation that appellate review, scientifically astute or 
policy-making trial judges, or juries can function to solve or evade the 
problem of discerning reliable expertise.  Though we share the 
confidence that appellate judges can correct abuses of discretion by 
means of evidentiary rulings, we have no illusions that, as a group, 
they possess the time and resources to serve as an anchor for disputes 
over reliability, such that de novo review should be the norm.  
Likewise, we support efforts to educate judges.  In addition to 
scientific methodology, however, pragmatic social, institutional, and 
rhetorical aspects of science must also be understood.235  Some argue 
that judges should make “science policy” and set their own standards 
for sufficiency apart from science.  Admissibility standards are legal, 
not scientific, constructions; yet, this is not without risks.  If scientific 
expertise (even modestly conceived) is disengaged from law, the 
courtroom might be saddled with an unscientific (and therefore 
unreliable) “legal science.” 
Finally, with respect to those who question reliability standards 
by way of idealizing the jury’s role, we are concerned, like Professor 
Sanders, about jurors’ capacities to understand complex scientific 
evidence, even though the research on that problem is not 
conclusive.236  While Professors Mansfield and Nance reject the notion 
that jurors are unsophisticated, 237 we consider this debate as 
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significant.  Unlike Professor Faigman, we cannot casually disregard 
it.238  This Article does not attempt to idealize jurors, trial judges, or 
even appellate judges.  No single structure of the legal system 
provides a “panic room” where one can escape the problems of 
reliable applications. 
Recognizing the practical limitations of both science and law 
helps scholars to avoid impractical proposals for reform.  Typically, 
since the pragmatic aspects of science are demonized, idealizations of 
science result in proposals for an overly restrictive regime.  
Idealizations of law likewise generally produce proposals with 
impractical features.  Romantic images of appellate courts fail to 
recognize their limited resources.  Romantic images of trial judges 
overestimate their capacity to criticize expertise and make “science 
policy” decisions.  And romantic images of the jury disengage science 
from law.  Moreover, proposals to raise the admissibility standards for 
forensic scientists, or lower them for civil trial plaintiffs, if successful, 
could engender other changes to the legal system.  To illustrate, if 
courts agree to go easier on plaintiffs’ experts, tort reform advocates 
might gain the upper hand.  As Professor Lillquist humorously, and 
shrewdly, suggests, if 
Judge Pollak had stuck to his decision in United States v. Llera 
Plaza, limiting the testimony of the government’s fingerprint 
examiners and forbidding them from opining that a particular 
print is from a particular person . . . it seems to me at least 
possible, if not likely, that Congress would have quickly passed 
legislation entitled something like the Latent Fingerprint 
Admissibility Act of 2002.239 
For our purposes, changes in one area of the law can generate a 
backlash.  Therefore, solutions must take into account the practical 
context.  In the area of admissibility of scientific expertise, for 
example, arguments for restrictiveness that rest on idealizations of 
science are met with arguments that idealize the jury in order to 
overcome those restrictions.  So long as one modestly views both 
science and law as pragmatic enterprises, the trilogy’s focus on 
application can work in its present form without raising or lowering 
reliability standards, and without changing the abuse-of-discretion 
standard or the current roles of judges as gatekeepers and jurors as 
beneficiaries (or victims) of a gatekeeping regime. 
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